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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED
MALICE IN THE LAW OF MURDER
Express malice entered the law of homicide about the thirteenth
century and apparently fulfilled the needs of the times fairly satis-
factorily, for it was in the early seventeenth century before the use
of implied malice became important. The doctrine of implied malice
did not come into being until society found it necessary to achieve a
desired result. Homicides were being committed in which no ex-
press malice was present and-none could be inferred. Consequently,
the need arose for a concept of malice, which is the necessary ele-
ment for a conviction of murder, so that malice would be deemed to
exist as a matter of law in cases where express malice was not
present yet the killer deserved to be punished for murder.
At first malice was implied in at least two instances. It is diffi-
cult, however, to determine the order of their development in the
law. Lambard and Coke, the early English law writers, list the
situations in which malice will be implied in this order (1) killing
of an officer while resisting arrest (2) killing while attempting to
rob. The writer, however, would list these two categories in re-
verse order, since the first case he has discovered in which malice
was implied was a case in 1555 involving a killing during the com-
mission of robbery. In that case several men were convicted of
murder for the killing of a by-stander while they were attempting
to rob a house.' This is the beginning of what later became known
as the felony-murder doctrine. It is very probable, however, that
the early courts confined the inference of malice to killings which
occurred in this particular type of felony. At any rate, the early
English law writers, who formed categories into which implied
malice could be grouped, limited this category to robbery cases.'
There would seem to be no reason for this other than the fact that
robbery was one of the most serious crimes of the times. Coke, in
his work on criminal law, states a broad rule to the effect that a
killing during the commission of any unlawful act constitutes mur-
der. This statement has been severely criticized by subsequent
writers,' By 1701, there was no doubt that Coke's rule had been
modified so as to apply only in cases of felonies.' In Regina v.
'Mansell and Herbert's Case, 1 Dyer 128b, 73 Eng. Rep. 279
(1555). Regina v. Dacre (Lord) (1543) is cited in 1 HALE, HISTORY
OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) 439 and Foster, CROWN LAW (2d
ed. 1791) 354, as holding the same, but the reported case is not
available to the writer.
2 3 COKE, THIRD INSTITUTES (6th ed. 1680) 52; 1 HALE, HISTORY OF
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) 465.
'STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883)
57.
STUDENT NOTES
Woodburne et al. the court stated by way of dictum that it would
be murder if a man shot at a fowl and accidentally killed a man, if
he intended to steal the fowl since the stealing of a fowl was con-
sidered a felony. This illustration indicates that the felony-murder
rule, even with this limitation, was still too harsh.
Apparently, however, the felony-murder rule was followed
strictly for some time. But in 1887, Justice Stephen, in Regina v.
Serne,' placed a further limitation upon the rule. He instructed
the jury, ". . . I think that, instead of saying that any act done
with the intent to commit a felony which causes death amounts to
murder, it would be reasonable to say that any act known to be dan-
gerous to life, and likely in itself to cause death, done for the pur-
pose of committing a felony which causes death, should be murder."
This instruction has had a great influence upon what is known
today as the felony-murder doctrine, and since that time the law
has remained substantially the same.
The second instance in which malice was implied was in the
cases in which officers were killed while exercising their duties.
Officers of the law were under peculiar protection which made the
killing of one of them, by a person resisting arrest, a flagrant defi-
ance of the law of the state and hence malice was implied! The
first case the writer has discovered in which malice was implied
under these circumstances was in Yong's Case decided in 1587.
The law, that to kill an officer in resisting arrest was murder per se
and the defendant could not be heard to say that he did not intend
to commit harm, was followed strictly for some time. It was not
until Regina v. Porter," in 1873, that this rule was altered. In that
case the defendant, in an attempt to escape, killed an officer by
kicking him. The court refused to imply malice. A few years later,
in State v. Weisengoff,' an American case, an officer stepped upon
the running board of defendant's car in an effort to make an arrest.
The defendant started the car and in an attempt to escape the juris-
diction collided with a bridge, killing the officer. This court also
refused to imply malice toward the officer. These cases, although
exceptional, represent the modern and perhaps the better view.
The third instance in which malice was implied in known as
the negligent-murder doctrine. This was a much later development
'Rex v. Plummer, Kel. 109, 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701).
16 St. Tr. 53 (1722).
16 Cox C. C. 311, 313 (1887).
7 FOSTER, CROWN LAW (2d ed. 1791) 308:
"4 Co. Rep. 40a, 76 Eng. Rep. 984, 985 (1587) ". . . The law
adjudges it to be murder, and that the murderer had malice pre-
pense, because he set himself against the justice of the realm."
"STEPHEN, DIG. CR. LAW (1887) art. 223, illus. 11.
'12 Cox C. C. 444 (1873).
85 W. Va. 271, 101 S. E. 450 (1919).
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in the law than the two instances already discussed. One of the
first cases involving the negligent murder was as early as 1638." A
park-keeper tied a young boy to a horse's tail and when he whipped
the horse the boy was dragged ansd so severely injured that death
ensued. Because there was no intent to kill on the part of the
defendant, it became necessary for the court to imply malice from
the wanton act of the defendant, and this the court did. This case
was closely followed by Hull's case" in which a laborer threw some
stones from a roof. A stone hit a passer-by and caused his death.
The court refused to imply malice, but only on the grounds that
there was not sufficient negligence since it did not occur in a pop-
ulated district, but by way of dictum said that had this occurred
in a London street the laborer would have been guilty of at least
manslaughter. The quantity of negligence necessary for a murder
conviction during this era is not clearly defined. ' Today, however,
in order to imply sufficient malice for a conviction of murder the
act must be so dangerous to others and so wantonly done as to evi-
dence a depravity of mind and an utter disregard of human life and
the actor must have knowledge of the danger.
It is quite possible that all three of these circumstances in
which malice is implied could be grouped today into one single
category, that one being the negligent-murder category. But, per-
haps, from a practical viewpoint, it would be better to maintain the
separate and distinct categories with their limitations, which have
become so firmly entrenched in our law, since the same result is
reached.
A. E. Fumx, JR.
"Halloway's Case, 1 Cro. Car. 131, 79 Eng. Rep. 715 (1628)
"4 J. Kelyng 40, 84 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1073 (1664).
'MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 7;
Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability in
Criminal Homicide Cases (1938) 26 Ky. L. J. 209, 217.
